Tag Archives: hitler

Attempting the Impossible – Calculating Capitalism’s Death Toll

Update 8/10/18

Given the popularity of this post (and its recent resurgence), I figured I ought to write an update. The following post was written back when I was a senior in high school and still rather idealistic and polemical. Given that, this post clearly has rhetorical oomph that is not found in my current writings. Additionally, I no longer strictly endorse the number of deaths laid out in the following post for a few reasons. First, I think structural issues that cause violence can rarely be subsumed to simple fiscal policy and as such, saying Capitalism killed X or Communism killed Y masks violence perpetrated by larger institutions. Second, and more importantly, while ideology is certainly a driving factor in violence, individuals are just as much to blame and thus I worry that saying a given ideology as such is responsible for a given number of deaths is a convenient way to let individuals off the hook. And third, there are so many deaths that go unaccounted for in our world that it would be foolish to assume that I can provide an accurate account while living in a first world country. Indeed, I think it’s foolish to assume that anyone could provide an accurate number. Given that, take everything with a grain of salt. I leave this post up as it is part of my intellectual heritage. If need be, a longer and more in-depth preface may be written.

To anyone still reading, I do think overall argument / analysis holds, but I do not currently stick to any hard-and-fast number. I suggest that everyone do their own research and use this post as a starting point.

INTRODUCTION:

While there have been other attempts to count up the number of deaths that can be attributed to Capitalism (to counter the figures presented in The Black Book of Communism as well other places), most noteably, determinatenegation’s list and The Castroists’ list, neither critique the methodology used by the the supporters of the “OMG Communism killed 70 trillion people!!1!” nor do they provide easy to verify sources. So while I think both lists are fabulous (and I may use parts), this post will be not only a critique of the methodology used by the other side, but also a more user friendly list.

Continue reading →

US Security Discourse: Physical and Ontological Implications

 

Part 1: Genealogy of War

            The past 200 years has seen a dramatic shift in the United States, the United States’ supposed “role in the world”, and, contrary to the video game series Fallout’s motto[1], even the very nature of war itself. Over 200 years ago, a group of wealthy white aristocrats decided that they had had enough of England’s “oppression” over them and they decided to revolt and form a new nation built around the pillars of liberty, equality (for some), and for lack of a better word, isolationism. In his farewell address, George Washington is quoted as having said “[i]t is our true policy to steer clear of permanent alliance with any portion of the foreign world” (Fromkin). However, this “true policy” was not to last as demonstrated by World War I wherein the US’ role shifted from stoic observer to what some neoconservatives like to call the “benevolent hegemon” (Dolman). In addition and parallel to this shift in the US’ role in the world, there was a change in the very nature of war itself. Before the 19thcentury, wars were conceived “as battles between sovereigns”, but all that changed with the advent of so called “strategic bombing” commonly credited to the Italian theorist Giulio Douhet (Collier and Lakoff 4). According to Douhet, war was “no longer [a thing] fought between armies but between whole peoples. All the resources of a country…would focus on the war effort” or, as it is commonly called, “total war” (C&L 5). Thus the rise of total war saw with it the rise of a new kind of geopolitical strategy, that of threat calculation in regards to so called “critical infrastructure”.  In addition, total war’s rise created a whole new beast, the unpredictable threat. This new kind of threat, one that “did not fit within the strategic framework” of the time, necessitated a new kind of response, that is to say, a new kind of outlook on threats in general (C&L 3). Everything was perceived as a potential target, from the obvious military bases to the less obvious roads and water towers (the “critical infrastructure”).  Everything was under attack and everyone was a potential combatant and thus the reign of the constant threat began.

Continue reading →